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BUTLER v. AMERICAN TRAWLER COMPANY
United States Court of Appeals,Fifth Circuit, 6 October 1989
887 F.2 d20
An invited ship passenger's diversity action against a wharf owner to recover for injuries sustained while attemping to
board a docked ship was governed by maritime law's three year statute of limitations.
FACTS: Barbara Butler alleged that on May 8, 1984, she tried
to board a ship, the Sea Lion VII, docked in Newington, New
Hampshire. As she approached the end of the wharf, she noticed
that the ladder from the wharf to the ship was not usable. She
decided to climb down to the Sea Lion VII using the vessel's
rigging, which was in close proximity to the wharf. While at
tempting to board the ship in this manner, she severely injured
her finger in the ship's rigging. She sued on the theory of
negligence, claiming that American Trawler, the owner of the
wharf, failed to provide a usable ladder. The district court
granted American Trawler's motion for summary judgment.
The motion was based upon Butler's failure to file suit within
the three year statute of limitations, imposed by federal
maritime law. 46 U.S.C. App. §763a. Butler had argued that
Maine's six year statute of limitations applied.
ISSUE: Whether boarding a ship bears significant relation to
traditional maritime activities, for the purposes of determing in
a diversity suit, whether a tort that occurs while boarding a
ship, is within admiralty jurisdiction and thereby governed by
maritime law?
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals, for the Fifth Circuit, held
that boarding a ship was within admiralty jurisdiction and
governed by maritime law's three year statute of limitations.
Maritime law will govern if admiralty jurisdiction pertains.

Austin v. Unarco Industries, Inc., 705 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983).
Admiralty jurisdiction will lie when the tort at issue 1) occured
on navigable waters and 2) bore a significant relation to tradi
tional maritime activities. In the case at hand, the tort occurred
on navigable waters. The fact that the injury took place on the
ship, precluded a debate over whether the wharf was to be
considered part of the land. For the purposes of admiralty juris
diction, the controlling case law holds that the tort occurs where
the negligence "takes effect," not where the negligent act took
place. Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249,
266 (1972).

In addition to the fact that the injury occurred on navigable
waters, is the unarguable fact that the boarding of a ship bears a
significant relationship to the traditional activities associated
with maritime tasks. Boarding and walking on a ship is signific
antly different from walking into and around a building.
Butler alleges that the three year federal statute of limitations
is not applicable because it is not part of substantive maritime
law. Butler claims that the three year statute of limitations is
procedural, therefore, the federal court should apply the six
year Maine statute of limitations for this diversity action. The
Supreme Court has made clear that a maritime tort is a "type of
action wh�ch the constitution has placed under national power
to control in its substantive as well as its procedural features."
This negates the need to discuss what part of the legal lore will
surround the terms "procedural" and "substantive". Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953). Thus the relevant
question is not whether the federal statute of limitations, 46
U.S.C. App. §763(a), is "substantive" or "procedural," but
whether Congress intended the statute to preclude the operation
of different state limitations in respect to maritime torts. The
language and the legislative history of the subsequently enacted
federal statutes contain nothing to suggest that Congress in
tended to permit states to apply their own, differing statutes of
limitations. In 46 U.S.C. App. §763(a), the words "unless
otherwise specified by law," refer only to federal law, and not to
state law.
Under general maritime law, therefore, a plaintiff may not
begin a personal injury action, based upon a maritime tort, more
than "three years from the date the cause of action accrued."
Butler's action was correctly dismissed for failing to file the suit
within the applicable time period.
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